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Abstract 
The 2008 crisis started as a financial crisis and evolved into a sovereign debt crisis. 
Since 2008, central banks, governments and international organizations have been 
working on the lessons learned as well as designing options for a new financial 
framework. From the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States to Basel III, the 
international financial world has seen relevant changes. In Europe, the 'Banking 
Union' was passed. In itself, it is already an interesting reform. But beyond the 
primary objective of the Banking Union, which is to ensure financial stability, there is 
also a second feature: it deepens the European integration providing a response to 
the critics of the European project. Now equipped with an internal market of goods, 
services, including financial services, the question is to know whether the EU has 
fixed its structural issues in terms of governance. If a new crisis were to hit Europe, 
would the latter be better prepared to respond? Another question is to know whether 
this new framework would reduce the systemic risk and thus would reduce either the 
likelihood or the magnitude of a crisis? 
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1. Introduction 
This paper proposes an analysis of the newly designed Banking Union and its impact on the likelihood 
of a future crisis. A set of guidelines and regulations has been put in place by various institutions and 
organisations since the 2008 financial crisis: from the Financial Stability Board guidelines, the Dodd-
Frank Act in the U.S. to the Banking Union in Europe. All of them start with the assumption that the 
2008 crisis was the result of a high systemic risk. Hence, the goal of these regulations is to lower this 
systemic risk. 
Now, even if the aim of the Banking Union is to reduce the systemic risk, it has two different 
dimensions: on one hand, it is a mega insurance plan for banks, and on the other hand, it consists in 
promoting financial integration in an unprecedented manner for Europe. By definition, the insurance 
part of the Banking Union does not reduce systemic risk, but it covers banks and countries against it. 
However, the key question is to know whether financial integration – the other dimension of the 
Banking Union – helps reduce systemic risk. 
Let us put this question in the current context. Indeed, a new government from the far left is elected in 
Greece, and the euro area is again in the spotlights. But things are different in 2015 than they were in 
2008. In October 2013, the rating agency Fitch reassessed the rating of Spain from "negative" to 
"stable". Also in October 2013, the former president of the European Central Bank (ECB), Jean-Claude 
Trichet, announced that Spain was "more competitive than France and Italy." Spain has a trade surplus 
in the first half of 2013, for the first time since 1971. Table 1 shows the ratings of some European 
countries and their evolution from 2005 to 2012 according to S&P. The countries that are back to their 
2005 level are in blue, the countries that improved their rating are in green (only Estonia), and the 
countries that have a lower rating than in 2005 are in red. Most of the European countries presented in 
this list have seen a depreciation of their rating. 
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Table 1. Credit rating of Euro Area countries (Source: S&P ratings, 2013) 
 
 
In short, Europe may be slowly recovering, but the question is to know from which crisis it is 
recovering? Indeed, Europe is still facing serious economic challenges (eg, refinancing debt remains a 
problem), as well as resolving the issues with European governance. The latter point is at the heart of 
the research proposed here. 
The first decade of the euro has been positive for the European economy. But the good economic results, 
in terms of economic convergence for instance, were in fact putting the attention away from the 
European governance issues. In short, the deepening of European integration should have been done 
during these relatively good times. The evidence of these governance issues came when Europe was hit 
by the 2008 financial crisis. Indeed, we believe the crisis has highlighted the structural problems of the 
European foundations.  
In the spirit of Churchill's famous quote (“Never let a good crisis go to waste”) (Boyer, Streeck, and 
Swedberg 2012), the European Union decided to put together new regulations and new institutions to 
oversee the European financial industry. This step represents a strong push towards financial 
integration in Europe. It also adds to the Single European Act of 1986 and the 2006 Services Directive.  
Europe was hit by the 2008 crisis the same way as the United States (Borio 2013). However, it seems 
the crisis has had a more dramatic impact in Europe due to its institutional architecture. The 
institutional framework is complex: there is the European Union (EU), which concentrates decision-
making power, and the euro zone, which has no decision-making power away from the institutions of 
the EU. This dichotomy is fragile and is the result of the history of European integration. The 2008 
crisis was exacerbated by this dichotomy. 
In this context, we can present our research question and its related sub-questions. 
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Research question: our main research question is to know whether the new institutional framework to 
promote financial integration is enough to protect the eurozone from future crises. In response to 
pressure from financial markets, Europe will be equipped with new solutions that strengthen the 
eurozone and reduce this dichotomy. In other words, the key question is to know whether financial 
integration helps reduce systemic risk. 
This suggests two sub-questions: 
• Sub-question 1: it is to know whether the Banking Union promotes financial integration 
against financial fragmentation. 
• Sub-question 2: it is to know whether the Banking Union reduces systemic risk or the 
magnitude of a new crisis. 
In order to answer these questions, our approach will be threefold. First, we present the analytical or 
theoretical rationale for financial integration in a monetary union like the euro area. Second, we present 
an empirical assessment of the level of fragmentation of the European financial sector, in particular since 
the 2008 financial crisis. Third, we present the institutional design of the Banking Union, and address 
the question of whether Europe will be more of an optimum currency area (OCA) and more credible. 
Our main contribution is twofold: on one hand, we explain the Banking Union in its current context, 
and on the other hand, we analyze the Banking Union based on the monetary economics literature 
framework (OCA and Credibility literatures). 
 
2. The theoretical framework to analyze financial integration in 
Europe 
Related to our research question and in particular to sub-question 1, which is to know whether the 
Banking Union promotes financial integration against financial fragmentation, this section is about 
developing a review of the literature to understand the issue of financial fragmentation versus financial 
integration. 
In what follows, we present the theoretical rationale for financial integration in the euro area. We 
mobilize two key concepts: the optimum currency area concept and the credibility concept, both coming 
from the monetary economics literature. 
The logic behind these two concepts and how they relate is the following: Is the Banking Union well 
designed to increase the European financial market’s credibility? If the answer is positive, it should then 
augment Europe’s credibility for financial activities, helping in return Europe to be closer to the 
definition of an optimum currency area. 
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2.1 The OCA (and endogenous OCA) literature 
Financial integration is at once a key element of what is an optimum currency area and also a 
consequence of a large and credible market. The question is not to know whether the euro area is an 
OCA2, but to know the degree of integration. 
This is how we mobilize and understand the OCA literature. The response to this question finds its 
roots into the definition of an economic integration (Mundell 1961; McKinnon 1963; Kenen 1969). 
According to Frankel and Rose (1998), this literature focuses on four inter-relationships between the 
members of a potential OCA: (1) the extent of trade; (2) the similarity of shocks and cycles; (3) the 
degree of labor mobility; and (4) the system of risk-sharing, usually through fiscal transfers. 
The Treaty of Maastricht was implemented in 1993 in order to ensure convergence to an OCA prior to 
adoption of a common currency. Five economic proxies were defined to measure the state of 
convergence. The proxies were respectively: inflation, exchange rate, national debt, public deficit, and 
long-term interest rates. Then, the economic literature started to develop an e-OCA theory known as 
the endogenous optimum currency area theory (e-OCA). According to Frankel and Rose (1998), 
adopting the same currency is only one part of the path towards an OCA since using a common 
currency will also force the economies to become an OCA. 
This is where financial integration is a sign of success of the convergence of the European economies. 
We can find this argument in Mundell (1973): if countries adopt a common currency without substantial 
changes to their purchasing parities, and thereby eliminate uncertainty in the exchange rate, then they 
gain a better allocation of capital. 
Although this is not yet the modern definition of what constitutes an endogenous OCA (since Mundell 
argues that purchasing parities should demonstrate some steadiness over time), he nevertheless 
emphasizes that gains in terms of allocation of capital are necessary to help create an OCA. So, financial 
integration can also serve as a foundation for further convergence.  
In the same vein, we can also find the spirit of the e-OCA theory already in the European Commission 
(1990)’s report stating that the EMU will reduce the incidence of country-specific shocks (Warin, 
Wunnava, and Janicki 2009). 
The institutional follow-up of these academic lessons from Europe is to both create a single market for 
goods and a single market for services. The single market for goods started in 1985 when the European 
Commission published a comprehensive blueprint to merge the fragmented national markets to create a 
single market by the end of 1992. In 1986, the EU adopts the Single European Act. 
About the single market for services, the Lisbon summit of EU leaders in March 2000 asked for a 
strategy to remove cross-border barriers to services, which led to the publication of a Report on the 
State of the Internal Market for Services in July 2002 by the European Commission. 
This report was thus made public a year after Greece became the twelfth member of the euro area (in 
2001) and 3 years after the inception of the euro (in 1999). The world economy and in particular Europe 
were doing well, maybe slowing the pace of reforms in Europe. Nevertheless, in January 2004 the 
Commission made a proposal for a Directive on services in the Internal Market, but there was no 
                                                      
2 According to Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993), Europe was not an OCA at the time of the Treaty of Maastricht. 
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inclusion of financial services, which is of primary interest to us as emphasized by the 2008 crisis.3 This 
directive just aimed to remove obstacles to trade in services, besides financial services. 
The Services Directive does not include financial services. It is the crisis of 2008 that pushed towards a 
new regulatory framework of the financial industry: the Banking Union (Warin and Prasch 2015). 
However, to be faire, there were already discussions about new regulations in 1999: the Financial 
Services Action Plan (FSAP) aimed to create a single market for financial services in the EU. But it is 
really the crisis that made things move forward (Boyer, Streeck, and Swedberg 2012). Reacting to the 
situation in 2008, several options were proposed: (1) in November 2008, a group chaired by Jacques de 
Larosiere was mandated to examine possible improvements to supervision and regulation, (2) the 
Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes4 and the Capital Requirements Directive5 were revised, (3) a 
regulation on Credit Rating Agencies6 was adopted and 4) the Commission has presented two 
Recommendations on remuneration principles.7 
H1. To summarize, the hypothesis is that financial integration is both a consequence and also enhances 
the optimality of the euro area. 
2.2 The credibility literature 
The debate about the efficiency of the monetary policy started with Keynes (1936), and was reinforced 
by the empirical work of Phillips (1958). Then, Lucas (1972) defended the neutrality of money, helping 
create the “New Classical School”, which defended the idea that discretionary monetary policy cannot 
produce long-lasting effects on output and employment. The debate was thus between the defenders of 
the “rule” and the proponents of “discretion” for the monetary policy. 
In 2004, Nobel prizes were bestowed upon Kydland and Prescott (1977) who developed the notion of 
“time inconsistency.” This notion captures the existence of a temptation for a central bank looking to 
maximize total surplus by not to respecting ex post its own ex ante monetary objectives. In other words, 
the possibility that monetary authorities will not respect their own commitments reduces the confidence 
that economic agents have in these individuals. As result, there will be an inflationary bias in the 
economy. But beyond this notion of inflationary bias, it is the lack of confidence and its consequences 
that are highlighted by this literature. In particular, a new notion appears, which is “credibility.” 
Indeed, the debate shifted course with the introduction of this concept. Barro and Gordon (1983) were 
the first authors to explain that the degree of confidence in the central bank is relevant for economic 
agents when they form their expectations about future inflation.  
 
Inspired by the new set of questions raised by the notion of credibility, Rogoff (1985) proposed the 
appointment of a “conservative central banker who is more risk averse to inflation than the average 
economic agent. Rogoff’s model has created the momentum for the modern theory of central banks. 
                                                      
3 The Services Directive was finally adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in December 2006 and needed to be transposed by 
the Member States by the end of 2009 (The Service Directive (Directive 2006/123/EC of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market) 
needed to be fully implemented by the Member States by 28 December 2009). 
4 1994/19/EC as amended by 2009/14/EC 
5 Directive 2006/48/EC 
6 Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 (OJ L 302, 17.11.2009, p. 1) 
7 C(2009) 3159 and C(2009) 3177, both of 30.4.2009 
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Neumann (1991) pushes the literature towards the relevance of an effective institutional design, and in 
particular on the advantages of having an independent central bank.  
The debate moved from the “rule versus discretion” debate into a “credibility versus flexibility” one. 
However, these debates were taking part in a closed-economy model. What would be the advantage of 
introducing an open-economy perspective? Well, in an open-economy set-up, for instance, the study of 
exchange rate mechanisms has closely accompanied the literature on optimal currency areas (Mundell 
1961). Consideration of the exchange regime is essential since it may constrain the central bank.  
As a consequence of a lack of credibility, a country will face a large risk premium. From there, it is 
possible to define criteria according to which an exchange rate regime is more credible than another 
(Herrendorf 1999).  
H2. To summarize, the hypothesis is that financial integration is both a consequence and also enhances 
the credibility of the euro area. 
2.3 The notion of systemic risk 
The notion of systemic risk is intrinsically linked to the notion of credibility in our theoretical 
framework. Indeed, credibility is an abstract notion and systemic risk can serve as a proxy to measure or 
illustrate the lack of credibility. 
To begin, let us define the three types of risk. The first two are traditional in the mean-variance 
framework (Markowitz 1952; Sharpe 1963; Lintner 1965), and the third may be slightly different from 
standard definitions, but it is necessary to the following analysis (Warin and Prasch 2015): 
(1) Definition of specific risk: Specific risk is the risk attached to the asset itself. It is diversifiable. 
(2) Definition of systematic risk: Systematic risk is undiversifiable risk, it captures vulnerability to events 
beyond the financial market itself: natural catastrophes, unexpected macroeconomic “shocks”, etc.  
(3) Definition of systemic risk: Systemic risk is endogenous in the sense that it is a positive function of the 
level of complexity or opacity within the overall market. It captures the risk of collapse of the entire 
financial system due to its interlinked and interdependent aspects, including short-term credit and 
counterparty risks. 
Systemic risk is a critical notion. When we add the systemic risk perspective to the traditional 
definitions of risk (specific and systematic), we understand that a fragmented financial system increases 
systemic risk and thus the overall level of risk. 
H3. To summarize, the hypothesis is that the lack of credibility creates financial fragmentation and thus 
increase systemic risk. In other words, financial integration helps reduce systemic risk. 
3. The banking sector in Europe: Fragmented of Integrated? 
In this section, we present an empirical assessment of the level of fragmentation of the European 
financial sector, in particular since the 2008 financial crisis. 
The context is drawn from our main research question, which is to know whether the new institutional 
framework promotes financial integration and whether it is enough to protect the eurozone from future 
crises, including both sub-questions: 
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• Sub-question 1: it consists in knowing whether the Banking Union promotes financial 
integration against financial fragmentation. 
• Sub-question 2: it consists in knowing whether the Banking Union reduces systemic risk or the 
magnitude of a new crisis. 
The three hypotheses coming from the review of the literature are: 
• H1. The hypothesis is that financial integration is both a consequence and also enhances the 
optimality of the euro area. 
• H2. The hypothesis is that financial integration is both a consequence and both enhances the 
credibility of the euro area. 
• H3. To summarize, the hypothesis is that the lack of credibility creates financial fragmentation 
and thus increase systemic risk. In other words, financial integration reduces systemic risk. 
The 2008 financial crisis is the biggest crisis of modern finance. We have evidence that prior to the 
crisis, financial integration was happening, but in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, European 
financial markets are now more fragmented. In particular, according to Mijs (2014): “the share of cross-
border Euro Area’s interbank loans fell from 36% at the start of 2008 to the present 25%; the cross-
border loans to businesses in the Euro Area account for just 8% of the total; the same share of cross-
border border integration for households loans is below 1%; the cross-border bank holdings of debt 
securities issued by Euro Area corporates and sovereigns decreased from a level above 30% in 2006 to 
just 16%; the divergence in the interest rate of loans to businesses is twice as much as that observed 
before the crisis; the cross-border integration of subsidiaries and branches as a share of total banking 
assets fell from 18.5% in 2009 to 16.4% in 2013” (Mijs 2014). 
In the words of the European Commission, financial fragmentation is the “differences in the functioning 
and performance of financial markets of different jurisdictions caused by obstacles to the free movement 
of capital and/or financial services across borders”. In other words, according to Mijs (2014): “if the aim 
of the single market is the integration and the convergence of the different national markets, 
fragmentation is the process of divergence and differentiation of financing conditions along legal and 
geographical borders” (Mijs 2014). 
The proxies to know whether there is financial fragmentation are, among others: (1) spreads in 
sovereign bonds (Figure 1), (2) a reduction in cross border activities (Figures 2 and 3), and (3) liquidity 
differences across countries (Figures 4, 5 and 6). 
3.1 Spreads in sovereign bonds 
As highlighted on Figure 1, the crisis has had a major impact on the process of financial integration in 
the euro area. Although not as fragmented as before the inception of the euro, the markets are now more 
dispersed. The convergence seen between 1999 and 2008 is over. 
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Figure 1. 10-years sovereign bond yields in selected EA countries (Source: Mijs 2014) 
 
In terms of a reduction in cross-border activities, Figure 2 displays total portfolio investment holding of 
selected euro area countries. At first, it looks reassuring since the numbers are higher in 2012 compared 
to 2006. 
3.2 A reduction in cross border activities 
Since 2008, we have observed a reduction in cross-border banking activities.  
Figure 2. Total portfolio investment holding of selected Euro Area countries in the EMU (Source: IMF CIPS, Mijs 
2014) 
 
However, when we look more precisely at the data, we can observe a fall in the share of cross-border 
interbank loans in the euro area since 2008 (Figure 3). 
10 of 18 
Figure 3. Share of cross-border interbank loans to total loans in the Euro Area (% of total loans) (Source: Mijs 2014) 
 
As of April 2014, the cross-border interbank loans are still far away from the 2008 levels. 
3.3 Liquidity differences across countries 
When it comes to measuring the liquidity differences across countries, we observe indeed big variations 
since the 2008 crisis (Figure 4). 
Figure 4. Interest rates on bank loans to SMEs in selected countries (Source: ECB, 2014, Mijs 2014) 
 
Also, there is a big difference in terms of non-performing loans across euro area countries (Figure 5). 
This may cause an increase in risk premia since it may affect the credibility of these countries. 
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Figure 5. Non-performing loans as share of the total, % (Source: World Bank, 2014, Mijs 2014) 
 
In terms of liquidity differences across countries, we can have a look at the private credit flows. We can 
observe major differences across the European Union (Figure 6). 
Figure 6. Private Credit flow in the EU, % of GDP (Source: Ameco, 2013, Mijs 2014) 
 
Two countries are of particular relevance here: Germany and France. They are the biggest economies in 
the euro area and the overall EU (in 2014). Private credit flows are stable in Germany (no increase) but 
are decreasing in France, in particular since the crisis, which is not a good sign for financial integration.  
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4. The Banking Union: Will Europe be more of an OCA and more 
credible? 
In this third section, we present the institutional design of the Banking Union. We address the question 
of whether the Banking Union will increase Europe’s credibility, enhancing financial integration, thus 
getting closer to an OCA. 
Indeed, related to our research question and in particular sub-question 2, this section is about analyzing 
whether the Banking Union reduces systemic risk or the magnitude of a new crisis. 
To address this research question, let’s first illustrate what were the early ages and the economic and 
financial context of the Banking Union, and then we will present the Banking Union’s legal framework. 
Eventually we will draw some conclusions about the likelihood that the Banking Union leads to a 
reduction in systemic risk. 
4.1 The early ages: The Jacques de Larosière Report 
In November 2008, the European Commission mandated Jacques de Larosiere to chair a group in order 
to write a report proposing improvements to supervision and regulation. The group came up with the 
conclusions that financial markets in Europe were too fragmented, and this fragmentation was the result 
of the lack of a single market for financial services. They pointed out that there was no single definition 
of credit institution; no single definition of capital; no single definition of non-performing loans and 
forbearance; very diverse deposits insurance scheme; no uniformity in the accounting rules; no 
uniformity in the calculation of risk-weighted assets; etc. 
It was obvious since 2008 that the EU needed further reforms. The Single Market for goods and 
services never extended to financial services. The report served as a trigger to move forward in this 
direction. 
4.2 The Banking Union’s legal framework 
The goal is to create a safer and more integrated financial sector for the single market. These initiatives, 
which include stronger prudential requirements for banks, improved depositor protection and rules for 
managing failing banks, form a single rulebook for all financial actors in the 28 Member States of the 
European Union. The “single rulebook” is the core of the Banking Union. 
However, the difficulty was to propose an institutional framework that would suit the needs of the EU 
non-euro members, as well as one that would suit the needs of the EU euro members. Indeed, as the 
financial crisis evolved and turned into the Eurozone debt crisis, it became clear that, for the euro area 
members, a deeper integration of the banking system was needed. The Banking Union was thus 
designed as a set of two mandatory packages for the euro area members: (1) the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism and (2) the Single Resolution Mechanism for banks. Non-euro area members can join on a 
voluntary basis. 
In a nutshell, for the EU members (and the euro area members), the Single Rulebook applies. It consists 
in two items (as of today): 
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• Capital Requirements: the original Capital Requirements Directives8 have been replaced by a 
new legislative package known as “CRD IV”. 
• Deposit Guarantee Schemes: Deposit Guarantee Schemes9 reimburse a limited amount of 
deposits to depositors whose bank has failed. From a financial stability perspective, this promise 
prevents bank runs, thereby reducing systemic risk. 
Only for the euro area members (and the other EU members who decide to join on a voluntary basis), 
the Banking Union consists in two items: 
• The Single Supervisory Mechanism: The European Central Bank becomes the central 
prudential supervisor of financial institutions in the euro area (including approximately 6000 
banks) and in those non-euro EU countries that choose to join the SSM. The European Central 
Bank directly supervises the largest banks (140 of them), while the national supervisors 
continue to monitor the remaining banks. 
• The Single Resolution Mechanism: The mechanism will allow failing banks bank to be managed 
through a Single Resolution Board and a Single Resolution Fund, financed by the banking 
sector. Its purpose is to ensure minimal costs for countries’ budgets and to the real economy. It 
should increase the credibility of the financial system overall. 
4.3 The Banking Union: Is it enough? 
Is the Banking Union well designed to increase the European financial market’s credibility? If the 
answer is positive, it should then augment Europe’s credibility for financial activities, helping in return 
Europe to be closer to the definition of an optimum currency area. 
Based on the framework aforementioned and on the institutional design of the Banking Union, we will 
assess the country differences in terms of credibility (we use the degree of systemic risk as a proxy as 
well as some indicators from Graph Theory). 
In terms of credibility differences, Greece is an interesting example (Figure 7). In particular, it is very 
interesting to notice the variation between 2008 and 2013 in terms of foreign claims of the banking 
sector. 
                                                      
8 2006/48 and 2006/49. 
9 Review of Directive 94/19/EC 
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Figure 7. Foreign claims of the banking sector in Greece in 2008 and 2013 in million dollars (Source: BIS, 2014, own 
computations) 
 
Let us now consider the systemic risk notion to analyze the interconnectedness of the banking sector. 
What could be a good variable to approximate the systemic risk? The V-Lab at New York University 
has computed an indicator called SRISK. It measures the need in actual dollars of a bank in case of a 
bankruptcy. 
For the following 18 countries grouped into 4 categories, we compute the SRISK for all their banks 
(NYU V-Lab, 2014): (1) EU countries: Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, The Netherlands, (2) 
USA and Commonwealth countries: USA, Australia, United-Kingdom, Canada, (3) Emerging countries: 
South Africa, Brazil, India, Russia, Turkey, and (4) Other countries: Israel, Japan, Switzerland. 
In the following table (Table 2), we observe a peak of the SRISK in 2008 and a slow decrease. SRISK is 
anyway still high in 2013, and higher than in 2007, for instance. 
Table 2. Measure of the systemic risk (SRISK) of 18 selected countries from 2004 to 2013 in billion US$ (Source: NYU 
V-Lab, 2014, own computations) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
SRISK 723.89 710.98 684.72 1853.78 3339.69 2485.16 2603.52 3492.74 2964.86 2259.43 
In the following table (Table 3), we observe the SRISK as a percentage of total market value of the 
banks. It is interesting to note that European banks are more exposed than Banks from the UK and the 
US (data for 2013). 
Table 3. Measure of the systemic risk (SRISK) as a percentage of total market value of the 18 selected countries’ 
banks (Source: NYU V-Lab, 2014, own computations) 
European Union USA and Commonwealth Emerging Countries Other 
62.9% 13.74% 4.153% 19.21% 
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It would be interesting now to understand the links between the countries and how they evolve. Figure 
8 and Table 3 will help capture the dynamics of the financial system towards financial fragmentation. 
On the following figure (Figure 8), we illustrate the total foreign claims from the banking sector per 
country in 2008 and 2013. We observe a concentration of the European financial market around more 
credible countries, compared to the situation prior the 2008 crisis. 
Figure 8. Total foreign claims from the banking sector per country in 2008 and 2013 (Source: BIS, 2014, own 
computations) 
 
In the following table (Table 3), based on graph theory, we compute the three indicators: (1) 
eccentricity, (2) closeness centrality, and (3) betweenness centrality. 
Eccentricity highlights the countries that are different from the core countries. Closeness measures how 
close are countries in terms of foreign claims to each other, and betweenness centrality measures 
whether countries are at the core of the system. 
As illustrated in Table 3, the countries at the core of the system are Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, 
France and Italy (the UK is a little behind). This shows the fragmentation between the core countries 
and the others. 
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Table 3: Indicators from Graph Theory  (Source: BIS, 2014, own computations) 
Country Eccentricity Closeness.
Centrality
Betweenness.
Centrality
Austria 1.0 1.0 2.75
Belgium 1.0 1.0 2.75
Cyprus 0.0 0.0 0.0
Germany 1.0 1.0 2.75
Estonia 0.0 0.0 0.0
Spain 1.0 1.0 2.75
Finland 2.0 1.47 0.0
France 1.0 1.0 2.75
United@Kingdom 2.0 1.05 2.38
Greece 1.0 1.0 1.56
Ireland 2.0 1.42 0.22
Italy 1.0 1.0 2.75
Lithuania 0.0 0.0 0.0
Luxembourg 0.0 0.0 0.0
Latvia 0.0 0.0 0.0
Malta 0.0 0.0 0.0
Netherlands 2.0 1.21 1.13
Portugal 2.0 1.05 1.18
Slovenia 0.0 0.0 0.0
Slovakia 0.0 0.0 0.0  
To summarize, since 2008, the European financial markets have concentrated to the more credible 
markets and left some of the weaker, less credible, financial markets. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we propose a framework to analyze the potential impacts of the Banking Union. This 
paper aims to address the question to know whether the Banking Union will help reduce the systemic 
risk and as such prevent Europe from suffering from another crisis. 
The logic behind the Banking Union and its institutional design is that European financial markets 
needed to have a European insurance mechanism like the FDIC in the U.S., as well as a prevention 
mechanism. Both aim at reducing systemic risk. The insurance mechanism should avoid bank runs, and 
the prevention mechanism should avoid bank failures. 
However, although an improvement compared to the pre-2008 era, the Banking Union lacks some 
elements that would further financial integration. The Banking Union is only a small step towards the 
single market for financial services. To become an OCA, Europe needs also a single market for financial 
services (Mundell 1973).  Financial integration is a key element in this regard. So, although the Banking 
Union enhances European financial markets’ credibility, it does not go far enough in creating 
institutions that would reduce financial fragmentation. 
It would be interesting to analyze the Banking Union in a broader international context. Indeed, we 
could add the new regulations in the US (the Dodd-Frank Act), Basel III, and also the other European 
directives. 
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